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In wake of the September 11th attacks against the United States, NATO, 
for the first time ever in its history, invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. 
However, during the Iraq crisis of 2002-2003 the spirit of transatlantic solidarity 
expressed by all NATO members after the terrorist attacks vanished in the 
discussion of how to react to a potential Iraqi threat.  
The rapid change of rhetoric on both sides of the Atlantic exposed the 
different threat perceptions among the NATO countries. During early 2003, the 
European NATO members France and Germany opposed the US strategy of 
preemptive force against the Iraq in the absence of a concrete mandate by the 
United Nation’s Security Council. The fact that France, as well as Germany, 
interpreted the UN resolution 1441 as not including preemptive military force 
does not suggest that they shared a common approach to the Iraqi crisis. 
Germany ruled out the use of military means even before the final results of the 
weapons inspection were presented. France, in contrast, did not oppose the use 
of force, had a new UN resolution sanctioned it.      
Critics questioned publicly the future of NATO because of the US 
unilateral approach to the crisis. Critics saw the Franco-German opposition to the 
US-led ““coalition of the willing”” as a further weakening of the European Pillar of 
NATO. However, this opposition was not representative of the European Union 
(EU) and member countries did not find consensus on the Iraq question. In the 
context of the European unification process and the development of EU’s ESDP, 
the discord within the alliance raised the question, whether or not NATO still 
formed the primary organization of mutual defense and community of shared 
values or was the European Pillar of NATO via the ESDP not only “separable” 
but indeed “separate.”  
In April 2003, France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg proposed to 
establish separate European military planning capabilities which led critics to 
 xiv
question the solidarity among NATO members. France and Germany supported 
this proposal to strengthen ESDP, although this step could easily be interpreted 
as competitive with NATO’s European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). 
The reason for France and Germany to develop European capabilities 
regarding security beyond NATO’s framework of ESDI has different historical 
roots. Analysis of the historical evolution of security policy in France and 
Germany, as the two major players that shaped the future composition of ESDP 
in its competitive or supportive role to NATO, shows the vast differences in each 
nation’s objectives. The post World War II experience of France helped to create 
a security policy, which emphasizes French sovereignty and claim to leadership 
in Europe, independent military capabilities for the European Union and a 
separation from US domination in European security issues. Germany’s foreign 
policy also reflects country’s strong reaction to preventing future conflict, yet the 
focus and execution are quite different. Germany sought integration itself in 
multilevel security organizations, equal cooperation with European partners and 
NATO, while accepting more international responsibility. 
The balance of these two approaches represented by France and 
Germany will likely decide if the ESDP will support NATO’s role as Europe’s 
prime organization for security or weaken the alliance by duplicating capabilities, 
decoupling from NATO and discrimination of NATO members not in the EU. 
This research demonstrates with case studies of France and Germany 
how the historical experiences of major European actors have influenced the 
EU’s approach to security and defense issues. The thesis illuminates the 
circumstances, which led to France’s ambivalent relation with the Transatlantic 
Alliance as well as the root of Germany’s struggle for international integration. 
The present and future nature of the ESDP is a product of the historical relation 
between France, Germany and the United States. Recognizing the events, which 
created French or German support of European Defense and the underlying 
national motives, is essential in evaluating the EU’s relationship with NATO.    
 xv
This thesis argues that, since the end of World War II, European security 
and defense has been a source of continuous negotiations, transformations and 
bargaining. On the basis of shared values the NATO members were repeatedly 
able to negotiate consensus mid crisis in context with their national interests. 
Although internal crisis like the transatlantic discord during the Iraq question were 
hardly unique, the inappropriate use of defamatory rhetoric among NATO 
members regarding the creation and support of a ““coalition of the willing”” in 
January 2003 represented a negative exception.     
The comparison of the French and German approach to European 
security and defense after World War II does not suggest that ESDP will function 
solely as a supportive tool to NATO nor will it develop as a European competitor 
to NATO. The development of a more independent European defense in the form 
of the ESDP does not represent the end of the Transatlantic Alliance but signifies 































A. PURPOSE AND QUESTION   
This thesis focuses on the security and defense policies of two leading 
European nations, France and Germany, and their approach to NATO and the 
European Union policies for war and peace. Analysis of the French and German 
historical evolution regarding this issue since the end of World War II illuminates 
the character of major European policies in the assessment of the EU’s 
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in relation to NATO, especially 
since the beginning of the 1990’s.  
The thesis suggests that different national security interests of the leading 
EU nations mark the future relationship of ESDP with NATO. These national 
security interests follow a specific pattern developed since the end of World War 
II and before. This thesis shows the development and structure of these patterns 
of security policy in case studies of both France and Germany. The concluding 
chapter assesses the ESDP’s potential to develop as a competitor or supportive 
instrument for NATO. 
The questions leading to these conclusions are: 
• What were the milestones of transformation regarding NATO’s 
European Security and Defense Identity and the European Union’s 
ESDP? (Maastricht 1991, Petersberg 1992, Brussels 1994, Berlin 
1996, Saint-Malo 1998, Cologne and Helsinki 1999, Nice 2000)  
• What was the origin of the concept of French grandeur within the 
context of France’s relationship to NATO and European defense? ( 
EDC 1954, de Gaulle 1958, French withdrawal from NATO’s IMS 
1966, rapprochement with NATO 1995)      
•  Does Germany’s promotion of ESDP signal a drifting apart from 
the Transatlantic Alliance? (Ellysee Treaty January 1963, Franco-




B. SIGNIFICANCE  
The development of the ESDP might be the greatest challenge to the 
future of NATO. Although the EU members are presently not able to match the 
military superiority of the US, the ESDP could become a tool to duplicate NATO 
capabilities in order to separate European security issues from the dominant 
influence of the American allies. It is significant to recognize today’s development 
of ESDP as the product of different and competing national interests. The 
recognition and promotion of those forces within the European Union, which 
supports the concept of ESDP as strengthening the European Pillar within the 
framework of NATO, is essential to preserving the successful security effort of 
NATO. A further alienation of NATO members through the misuse of NATO as a 
resource pool for ad hoc coalitions like the ““coalition of the willing””, which was 
formed under US leadership to create support for a military intervention in the 
Iraq in 2003, will play into the hands of those forces in the EU, which demand an 
independent European way to approach security challenges. 
The significance of transatlantic institutions for war and peace and their 
development is recognized in a vast spectrum of specialized literature. Detailed 
information on German foreign and security can be found in Klaus Hildebrand, 
German Foreign Policy, From Bismarck to Adenauer, (London, Unwin Hyman 
Ltd, 1989); John S. Duffield, World Forsaken, (Stanford, Stanford University 
Press, 1998); Max Otte, A Rising Middle Power?, (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 
2000); Constantine Menges, The Future of Germany and the Atlantic Alliance, 
(Washington, The AEI Press, 1991). 
For in-depth Information on France see Anand Menon France, NATO and 
the Limits of Independence (New York, McMillian Press LTD, 2000); Michael 
Harrison The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1981); Richard Kuissel, Seducing the French  
(Berkley: University of California Press, 1996).       
This thesis will concentrate on the European actors, who have 
considerable influence over the future of the ESDP.  While UK continues to seek 
a way to take a larger role in Europe’s effort to unite, it most likely will never 
3 
deviate from the historical ties it has with the US. The UK’s conviction that the US 
participation and commitment is essential to guarantee Europe’s security is the 
primary motivation for the UK to promote European capabilities within the NATO 
framework.  
The position of the two continental European actors France and Germany 
is quite ambivalent with respect to the UK. The interaction of these two nations, 
which compete for the leading role in Europe and at the same time are 
dependent on each other to reach common goals, produces a continual pattern 
of support and challenges to the Transatlantic Alliance. Understanding the 
traditional objectives of these two nations will help to assess future 
characteristics of the ESDP and illustrated the problems at hand which extend 
beyond just slogan and rhetoric. 
 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The thesis analyzes the developments of NATO’s ESDI and the ESDP 
based on agreements and treaties achieved during NATO and EU summits, 
since the end of the Cold War in 1990. To underscore interpretations of these 
developments, this thesis uses official speeches by representatives of specific 
nations or organizations, as well as expert commentary and secondary literature 
of strategic policies. A case study on France and Germany reaching back to the 
end of World War II and before shows a pattern of national security policy, which 
was influential for the EU’s struggle to establish a common position on ESDP and 
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II. NATO AND THE EUROPEAN PILLAR OF DEFENSE 
The purpose of ESDP is not shaped by a single entity. Because Europe 
does not speak with one voice, the concept and goals of the common ESDP are 
the result of a European consensus. 
Among the EU countries there are several different approaches as how to 
improve European capabilities for security and defense.1 Although ESDP was 
born out off a broadly accepted necessity to establish and promote a European 
security and defense identity, the character of ESDP developed as a result of a 
variety of European objectives. The different sovereign nations of the EU try to 
shape ESDP accordingly to their national interests. Thus the ESDP is a product 
of negotiations leading to a consensus among the EU member states. The main 
influence in the evolution of ESDP lies with the economically and militarily 
dominant countries in the Union. This thesis concentrates on the two biggest 
continental actors, namely France and Germany. 
To analyze the EU’s position regarding ESDP means to understand the 
national forces acting on behalf of an independent European defense system or 
in favor of a European contribution to NATO as an Euro-Atlantic sphere of 
security. 
The most significant aspect of ESDP will be its relationship with NATO. 
Despite the obvious necessity to improve Europe’s military capabilities, ESDP 
will certainly develop as a tool for the EU in its bargaining process over the 
military burden sharing and international influence with the US. The analysis of 
Europe’s leading actors like France and Germany in its historical position 
towards NATO and Europe’s defense helps to understand the nature of the 
ESDP and its possible impact on NATO’s cohesion thus increasing US concern.  
                                            
1 Giovanna Bono, NATO’s Peace Enforcement, (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 
2003), p. 37. 
See also Wallace Thies, Friendly Rivals (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2003); Stanley Sloan, 
NATO,the European Union, and the Atlantic Community, (Oxford, Rowan & Littlefield Publisher, 
2003); Anand Menon, France, NATO and the Limits of Independence, (New York: MACMILLIAN 
Press INC., 2000); Ian Thomas, The Promise of Alliance, (Oxford, Rowan & Littlefield Publisher, 
1997); Robert Hunter, The European Security and Defense Policy, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002); 
Jacquelyn Davis, Reluctant Allies & Competitive Partners, (Dulles, Brassey’s Inc., 2002)   
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The close cooperation between France and Germany created a 
continuous momentum for the European integration including on the defense 
issue. In contrast, the UK limited its involvement on singular events, especially 
regarding the defense issue. Without the change in the UK’s position to a more 
autonomous European defense, it is doubtful, if the ESDP concept would have 
gained so much support. In general, however, the British approach to European 
Integration is more reluctant. The same is true for European defense efforts. The 
UK’s interest in the improvement of separable EU capabilities is dominated by its 
special relationship with the US and its leadership position the in European arm 
of NATO. The British goal is to build support for an increase in European defense 
expenditures to supplement NATO and increase Europe’s influence within the 
Alliance. The UK, for example, had no interest in putting the WEU under the 
control of the European Council (EC) like France and Germany did, nor does 
British policy reflect the notion of multi-polarity or the need to counterbalance US 
hegemony.2      
In April 2003, Britain’s Prime Minister Tony Blair answered his own 
rhetorical question: Why does this (France’s theses on a multi-polar world) matter 
so much?  
Because the outcome of this issue will now determine… the way 
Britain and the world confront the central security threats of the 
twenty-first century; the development of the UN; the relationship 
between Europe and the US; the relationship within the EU and the 
way the US engages with the rest of the world. It will determine the 
pattern of international politics for the next generation.3    
 
 
A. ESDI; MORE THAN TRANSATLANTIC BURDENSHARING   
European defense since the foundation of NATO was a bargaining 
process between the two sides of the Transatlantic Alliance. Despite the 
recognition of the common threat on both sides of the Atlantic, it is the nature of 
                                            
2 Giovanna Bono, NATO’s Peace Enforcement, (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 
2003), p. 38. 
3 Jolyon Howorth, France, Britain and the Euro-Atlantic Crisis in Survival, (The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 45, No. 4, 2003), p. 185. 
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democracies to minimize their share of the burden to fulfill different national 
obligations of the modern welfare state. This is the reason why Europe as well as 
the US used multiple techniques to shift the burden of collective defense to other 
members instead of accepting it’s to share of the burden. If the defense effort is 
seen as a zero-sum game the obvious solution is to convince other members to 
do more of the work while fending of requests from others.4  
It is hard to distinguish whether a NATO member is shifting the burden of 
collective defense or being exploited by other members. Is the US, for example, 
exploited by the European partners since its defense expenditures are higher 
than its allies? It is necessary to recognize that larger members of an alliance 
have more extensive interests and ambitions than smaller partners, so the 
defense expenditures and monetary contribution to NATO are not necessarily a 
valid measurement of burden sharing. In addition, sharing the burden between 
Europe and the US led to a strong division of labor that influenced the balanced 
collective forces.5 The US claimed for itself the production of costly hardware and 
the establishment of power-projection forces. In contrast, the European allies had 
to accept the burden of unbalanced national forces heavily dependent on the 
collective forces to come to its aid.6 This shifting of the defense burden through 
the division of labor is one reason for the dilemma in which the European 
countries find themselves today with their effort to transform Cold War forces into 
mobile power-projecting forces. It is no surprise that the US possesses strategic 
bombers, aircraft carriers and marine amphibious forces, while the European 
forces are heavily equipped with large conscription forces focused on territorial 
defense and ground war.  
                                            
4 Wallace Thies Friendly Rivals (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2003) p. 7. 
5 Ibid., p.76. 
6 Ibid., p. 62.  Article 5: The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them 
in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they 
agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or 
collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist 
the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other 
Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and 
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. 
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Nevertheless, the European members of NATO accepted their role too 
easily and continuously presented a target for US reproach claiming that the 
Europeans must increase their defense expenditures. Beginning in the 1950’s 
and steadily increasing in the late 1970’s US administrations promoted programs 
to convince their European partners to invest in military forces. The Carter 
administration promoted the European approval of a Long-Term Defense 
Program (LTDP) in 1977 to improve capabilities in logistics, electronic warfare 
and command, control and communications (C3). Later the Reagan 
administration developed a program for Conventional Defense Improvements 
(CDI), which focused on similar issues. Although the CDI program was endorsed 
by NATO in 1985, neither LTDP nor CDI could prevent the widening capabilities 
gap between the US and Europe.7 During the crisis in Bosnia 1995 the German 
General Klaus Naumann stated that the US de facto-monopoly of communication 
satellite channels  
Indicates quite clearly that without American support, an operation like 
IFOR in Bosnia could not be done… There is no security for Europe 
without the Americans.8   
 
Interestingly enough is the French evaluation for the gap between the EU and the 
US as expressed by an official French Ministry of Defense:  
This conflict illuminated the differences between the military means 
of the United States and Europe. The United States has developed 
extremely large military means that are justified by America’s world 
ambitions since the end of the Second World War.9 
         
It is obvious that such long-term alliances like NATO can put heavy strain 
on the cohesion among its members. Not only had the question of burden 
sharing led regularly to discord, It is part of the nature of alliances among 
democracies to engage in constant bargaining processes over burden, strategy 
or sovereignty. The reason that NATO is still a working organization although 
                                            
7 David Yost, The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union in Survival, (The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 42, No. 4, 2000), p. 102. See also Wallace Thies 
Friendly Rivals, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), p. 170.  
8 Ibid., p 102. 
9 Ibid., p. 103. 
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often challenged with extreme pressures is the fact that NATO adapts to new 
situations. The dilemma of Europe’s military deficiencies was recognized on both 
sides of the Atlantic, but the right impetus to solve the problem was missing.  
 
 
B. THE WAY TO SAINT-MÂLO  
After 1990, the European security environment changed dramatically. The 
call for a peace dividend was strong in all western countries. One result was a 
reduction of US troops in Europe. The large numbers of NATO troops to 
guarantee Europe’s freedom against a nuclear and conventional Soviet menace 
were no longer seen as necessary.  
The European NATO members came into a position where they were able 
to establish European security without the support of the United States. 
 
It is evident that the United States is disengaging from Europe…it 
cannot both leave and ask Europeans not to have a defense of 
their own. If the Americans were going to contribute less, Europe 
needed to develop its own capabilities.10 
 
This statement was an over-estimate of European capabilities and proved 
evident during the increasing conflict in the Balkan region. In addition to this 
growing confidence among the European members of NATO, the reunification of 
Germany led to the expectation that a future Germany would take a clearer 
responsibility regarding it’s share of the defense burden. The new weight of 
Germany promised a shift in the balance within NATO and a greater focus on 
Europe. Again, this turned out to be a gross overestimate. 
Nevertheless, the changed security environment gave an obvious impetus 
for the unification of the European Union. What was already mentioned 1986 in 
the Single European Act as momentum toward the development of a collective 
European defense, took greater shape in December 1991 at the Maastricht 
meeting. The European Union agreed on “the long-term perspective of a 
                                            
10 Anand Menon, France, NATO and the Limits of Independence, (New York: MACMILLIAN 
Press INC., 2000), p. 123. 
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common defense policy within the European Union, which might in time lead to a 
common defense.”11 In this context, the issue of the West European Union, 
which more or less lived in the shadows of NATO, was addressed as a possible 
defense component of the EU.   
The Maastricht Treaty on the European Union was signed in February 
1992. The Heads of State of the EU agreed on a Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP). 
The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions 
related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing 
of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common 
defense. The union requests the Western European Union (WEU), 
which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to 
elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which 
have defence implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the 
institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical 
arrangements12  
 
NATO recognized this development of greater European responsibility 
regarding security and defense and adopted its political and military structures to 
reflect the emerging European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). The nature 
of this greater European responsibility regarding security and defense was 
demonstrated through the Petersberg declaration, the WEU ministers met on 19 
June 1992 at Petersberg13, near Bonn, to identify classes of tasks suitable for 
European capabilities.14  These Petersberg tasks, which were later incorporated 
into Article 17 of the Treaty of European Union by the EU's Amsterdam Summit 
(10th November 1997), included 
• humanitarian and rescue tasks  
• peacekeeping tasks  
                                            
11 Michael Quinlan, European Defense Cooperation (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center 
Press, 2001) p. 16.  
12 Treaty on the European Union, Maastricht, 7 February 1992, Title V, Article J.4.  
13 Giovanna Bono, NATO’s Peace Enforcement, (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 
2003), p. 57. 
14 Michael Quinlan, European Defense Cooperation (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center 
Press, 2001) p. 20 
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• tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including 
peacemaking 
Although no permanent operational cell for WEU planning was 
established, a military planning cell of 40 staff members took over the task of 
identifying adequate forces for Petersberg missions.15 
NATO’s way to recognize this development of a greater European 
responsibility regarding security and defense was to make NATO assets 
available to EU led Missions on a basis of consultation in the North Atlantic 
Council (NAC).  
The most promising instrument to secure Europe’s effort within NATO’s 
framework was the Combined Joint Task Force concept (CJTF). One 
characteristic of the CJTF concept was that it would provide separable but not 
separate deployable Headquarters to the EU. 
The core concept of CJTF arose from the new challenges of the changed 
security environment.16 Small, diverse and unpredictable threat-scenarios called 
for a structural adaptation. The appropriate force structure should be easily 
deployable, multinational and tailored to specific military task. While the forces 
sub-groups are easy to assemble, the main focus is on the command and control 
arrangements. In order to guarantee the effectiveness of such a rapidly 
generated CJTF headquarters is composed of a core element, the nuclei, from 
existing NATO headquarters, which will be augmented by contributing partner 
countries. This concept enabled NATO to incorporate contributions from non 
                                            
15 “At the December 1999 Helsinki European Council meeting, EU Member States set 
themselves a military capability target known as the Headline Goal. It requires that EU Member 
States be able to deploy 60,000 troops, within 60 days and sustainable for a year, starting in late 
2003. These capabilities are to be used in support of Petersberg missions. EU-led forces 
assembled in response to a crisis would last only for the duration of the crisis and it would be up 
to the Member States themselves to decide whether, when and how to contribute troops.  
The self-sustaining element is envisioned to include the command, control, intelligence 
capabilities, logistics, and air and naval assets required to carry out the full spectrum of the 
Petersberg tasks. An additional pool of deployable units and supporting elements are available to 
provide replacements as required.” Gustav Lindstrom, The Headline Goal, (EU Institute for 
Security Studies); available from http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/05-gl.pdf; internet; accessed 19 May 
2004.  
16 Giovanna Bono, NATO’s Peace Enforcement, (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 
2003), p. 87. 
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NATO countries in context with a NATO enlargement as well as to support the 
evolving ESDI.    
In 1994 at NATO’s summit in Brussels the NATO members agreed to 
forestall the establishment of separate European structures by enabling the EU 
to draw upon NATO’s resources. This concept was called the Combined Joint 
Task Forces (CJTF) and made the combination of non-NATO elements with 
NATO assets like Headquarters or communication systems possible. The 1996 
meeting of foreign ministers in Berlin developed this concept even further and 
proposed that WEU led  missions  would make use of the multinational staff at  
NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) under the 
leadership of the Deputy Supreme Commander of Europe (DSACEUR), which is 
always a European senior officer.17  
In addition, several other key elements were established. 
• There could be “WEU-led” operations, including “planning and 
exercising of command elements and forces.” 
• NATO would identify “types of separable but not separate 
capabilities, assets and support assets, Headquarters, HQ 
elements and command structures, which could be made available, 
subject to decision by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and 
subsequent monitoring of the use of these forces by NATO. This 
continuing role of NATO in the use of its assets was later 
broadened to provide for their return or recall, if they proved to be 
needed by the alliance – e.g. in the event of a competing crisis or 
conflict. 
• Multinational European command arrangements within NATO 
would be worked out for WEU-led operations – i.e. “double hatting” 
of NATO personnel, who could be detached for use by the WEU. At 
the same time, NATO agreed that its Deputy Supreme Allied 
Commander of Europe (DSACEUR) could be used by the WEU as 
                                            
17 Michael Quinlan, European Defense Cooperation (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center 
Press, 2001) p. 22 
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its own strategic commander in the event of a WEU military 
operation. 
• All European members of NATO would be able to take part in 
WEU-led operations; including European command arrangements if 
they chose to do so (this was in particular a reference to Turkey).18 
 
NATO’s offer to use the CJTF concept to make NATO resources available 
to EU led operations led to misinterpretation by France of its original purpose19. 
France demanded that the CJTF staff reflect the composition of the troops 
committed and that the CJTF must serve NATO and WEU equally.20 
 
This interpretation led some in Paris to believe that a far-reaching 
"Europeanization" of the alliance was underway. It led some in 
Washington to believe that security tasks could in the future be 
divided between Europe and the United States, rather than shared.” 
“CJTF was hijacked by ESDI. At and after the Brussels Summit, 
U.S. and European officials, and therefore U.S. and European 
news stories, focused almost exclusively on how CJTF could be 
used by the Europeans acting without the United States. They did 
not make it clear that CJTF’s first rationale, and most likely utility, 
would be to facilitate trans-Atlantic operational responses to the 
emerging challenges addressed by the new strategic concept.21 
  
Despite the fact that France sought to gain automatic access to NATO’s 
assets and capabilities, NATO clarified in June 1997 its approval regarding the 
availability of NATO resources to EU-led operations:  
                                            
18 Robert Hunter, The European Security and Defense Policy, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), 
p.15. 
19 Anand Menon, France, NATO and the Limits of Independence, (New York: MACMILLIAN 
Press INC., 2000), p. 51. 
20 Jacob Kipp, Key Issues Confronting France, (Fort Leavenworth, Foreign Military Studies 
Office, 1995)  
21 Stanley Sloan, European Security and Defense Identity:  An American Perspective, 
(National Defense University, Symposium concerning NATO activities, March 1997); available 
from http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books%20-%201998/NATO%201997%20Sept% 2098 
/natoch3.html; internet; accessed 19 May 2004. 
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• provisional approval of the ESDI-related elements of the terms of 
reference of DSACEUR, under which, taking account of his 
strategic coordination function, he would have permanent 
responsibilities during peacetime as well as during crises and 
operations;  
• progress in developing arrangements for the release, monitoring 
and return or recall of Alliance assets and capabilities.22 
 
France saw this new freedom of action without the pressing threat of the 
Soviet Union as an opportunity to regain French influence in European security 
issues.  
However, in the early 1990's, France was unable to avoid NATO's 
adaptation to the post Cold War situation (reform and "go-ahead" 
for enlargement) and to transform WEU into the main European 
security organisation, which was mainly due to the strong British 
reluctance23 and to the German unwillingness to weaken NATO.24 
 
Three main aspects challenged the French aspirations. First, the 
deterioration of the Balkan crisis made obvious the gap between the military 
capabilities of the EU and of NATO with its US resources obvious. All members 
of the EU, including France, had to recognize that the EU was not able to control 
this regional conflict without the support of the US. Although the US was reluctant 
to commit to this European affair, it was certainly a way to underscore NATO’s 
supreme position regarding military issues. This also provided an opportunity to 
counterbalance increasing refusal of US influence in European security, which is 
de facto inseparability from American security. 
Second, NATO showed its capability to adapt to any new situation. 
Instead of declining to fulfill its superficial purpose, namely to contain Soviet 
                                            
22 North Atlantic Council in Defense Ministers Session, Final Communiqué, 12 June 1997 
23 Giovanna Bono, NATO’s Peace Enforcement, (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 
2003), p. 37. 
24 Jean-Pierre Froehly, The French Perspective: France's Position towards ESDI and ESDP 
(June 2000); available from http://www.dgap.org/english/text/france_esdi.html; internet; accessed 
19 May 2004. 
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power, NATO placed more emphasis on Articles25 concerning Collective 
Defense, which define NATO as an alliance of common objectives rather than a 
collective of guns and tanks. Article 10 of the Washington treaty26, the admission 
of new member states, played a major role in NATO adoption to the new 
challenges. NATO’s invitation to the Eastern European countries led to a 
confirmation of NATO’s role as guarantor of European security. Eastern Europe 
was more interested in NATO’s security umbrella than relying on the EU’s plans 
to assure European defense. Remarkable in this context, is the French reaction 
in 2003 regarding Eastern European support of the US Iraq policy. Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic, all of whom had dates for EU membership, 
joined EU members Britain, Spain, Italy, Denmark and Portugal in signing a letter 
in January 2003 to support Washington's stance on Iraq. French President 
Jacques Chirac called the letters "infantile" and "dangerous," adding: "They 
missed a great opportunity to keep quiet."27 
In 1995, France showed great reluctance to a possible NATO 
enlargement. The French Defense Minister Francois Lèotard explicitly rejected 
the extension of Article 5 guarantees to Central and East European states. While 
official statements emphasized French concern regarding Russia’s reaction as a 
reason to delay NATO’s enlargement, “privately, French officials expressed the 
opinion that enlargement should not be contemplated until the internal reform of 
NATO had been successfully carried out.”28 France continued to push for a 
reform of NATO, which reflects more European influence.  
                                            
25 Article 3: In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, 
separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will 
maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. 
Article 4: The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the 
territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened. 
26 Article 10: The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in 
a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North 
Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by 
depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The 
Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each 
such instrument of accession. 
27 BBC News, New Europe' backs EU on Iraq, (19 February 2003); available from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2775579.stm; internet; accessed 19 May 2004.  
28 Anand Menon, France, NATO and the Limits of Independence, (New York: MACMILLIAN 
Press INC., 2000), p.45. 
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Third, France’s absence of NATO’s integrated military structure prevented 
France from influencing NATO’s new adjustments. Since France was hardly part 
of the “policy community”, which promoted NATO’s transformation as a peace-
enforcement tool during the first air strikes in the Balkan crisis (1994) to 
Operation Deliberate Hope (1995), the realization of the CJTF concept 
progressed slow. In contrast, officials from the US, Germany and the Integrated 
Military Staff (IMS) were able to renovate NATO’s role through the support of 
certain policy communities.29 
Furthermore, France lacked experience with NATO’s internal structure, 
which in fall 1996 led to failed negotiations between Jacques Chirac and its 
Prime Minister Alain Juppe over the French demand for the position of 
CINCSOUTH.30 This brought the French rapprochement with NATO’s IMS to a 
sudden stop.    
Although, NATO’s arrangements, including the CJTF concept, promised a 
clear improvement of the EU’s freedom of action regarding military challenges, in 
which NATO would not be involved, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair made a 
surprising statement at a informal gathering of heads of government at 
Portschach, near Klagenfurt in October 1998. Blair outlined the nature of the 
discussions on European defense matters at a press conference. No formal 
decisions or records were taken at the meeting.  
A common foreign and security policy for the European Union is 
necessary, it is overdue, it is needed and it is high time we got on 
with trying to engage with formulating it and I think that people were 
pleased that Britain came to this with an open mind and was willing 
to participate in the debate and I think it is important that we do 
that.31 
 
                                            
29 Giovanna Bono, NATO’s Peace Enforcement, (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 
2003), p. 118. 
30 Anand Menon, France, NATO and the Limits of Independence, (New York: MACMILLIAN 
Press INC., 2000), p. 56. 
31 Mark Oakes, European defense: From Portschach to Helsinki (London: House of 
CommonsLibrary,21Feb2000),p.11; available from http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/ 
research /rp2000/rp00-020.pdf; internet; accessed 19 May 2004. 
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Since those meetings do not generate official communiqués it was an 
appropriate platform for Britain to make such a unexpected statement without 
drawing to much attention. It was a kind of test leading up to the Franco-British 
declaration on European defense in December 1998 in Saint-Mâlo.  
 
Although Britain took a skeptical position toward EU’s effort to incorporate 
autonomous military capabilities, Britain’s disappointment with the EU’s 
unimpressive weight during the Balkan crisis led to closer cooperation with 
France on this issue and to the following statement “the Union must have the 
capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means 
to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to 
international crises.”32 
The Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for 
analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for 
relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking 
account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its 
relations with the EU. In this regard, the European Union will also 
need to have recourse to suitable military means (European 
capabilities pre-designated within NATO’s European Pillar or 
national or multinational European means outside the NATO 
framework).33  
 
The reason for this change of British policy regarding European defense 
was certainly based on different objectives than those of France.34 Besides the 
fact that Britain needed to improve its image in a field of British strength, Britain’s 
main objective was to improve of the military capabilities available in Europe. 
Britain did not seek EU capabilities for its own sake. 
 
                                            
32 Joint Declaration on European Defense, UK-French Summit, Saint-Mâlo, 3-4 December 
1998. 
33 Joint Declaration on European Defense, UK-French Summit, Saint-Mâlo, 3-4 December 
1998 
34 Giovanna Bono, NATO’s Peace Enforcement, (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 
2003), p. 127. 
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Saint-Mâlo gave Britain, which had not joined the European 
Monetary Union or subscribed to the Euro, a chance to appear 
committed to the European “vocation”; further, it enabled London to 
throw in its lot with Paris, where the latter had much at stake in its 
twin competitions for influence with Germany (the greater) and the 
United States (the lesser). Provided that Britain could convince the 
United States that it was not straying from its basic allegiance to 
NATO—or straining at the “special relationship” with Washington—
this was a sustainable position. Indeed, on the morrow of Saint-
Mâlo, one of its British negotiators said to the TPN meeting in 
London, with its clutch of U.S. members of Congress, that Britain 
would never countenance any interpretation of Saint-Mâlo that 
could weaken NATO’s primacy.35 
 
Promoting a European way to improve Europe’s military capabilities 
seemed to be the contemporary solution to increase the contribution of the 
European Pillar to NATO. Britain’s intent was to make the European NATO 
members and especially Britain a more capable partner for future NATO 
operations. The disappointing experiences during the Balkan crisis made a 
significant impression on Britain’s self-confidence and clearly illustrates Europe’s 
role in international crisis management.36 The existing alternatives to convince 
NATO’s European members to accept more responsibility regarding robust 
military intervention capability were too weak.37 The concept of NATO’s ESDI 
lacked a strong momentum. The European NATO members did not support the 
idea to increase their military expenditures within the NATO framework past its 
original engagement. In addition, neither the EU nor the European NATO 
members would be able to accomplish credible military missions without France’s 
contribution. It was quite doubtful if the French contribution would be tied to 
NATO’s framework. A further development of the WEU did not seem promising, 
since the WEU continued with its reputation of being insignificant vis-à-vis NATO. 
The WEU never became a focus for the head of governments. This attention was 
                                            
35 Robert Hunter, The European Security and Defense Policy, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), 
p. 29. 
36 Stanley Sloan, NATO,the European Union, and the Atlantic Community, (Oxford, Rowan & 
Littlefield Publisher, 2003),p.174. 
37 Michael Quinlan, European Defense Cooperation (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center 
Press, 2001) p. 31. 
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on the future development of a united Europe, a Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) and eventually a common security and defense policy.       
Taken by surprise, the general reaction to the statements made at Saint-
Malo was positive regarding the EU’s commitment to take greater responsibility. 
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the meeting Britain and the US emphasized that 
such a development must not be counterproductive to NATO.38  
US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stressed NATO’s role as primary 
security alliance for Europe,  
I think what happened there was very important. There is a reason 
for the Europeans to find an identity in their own defense, but this is 
a thing that cannot be a duplication or discrimination. It is a manner 
by which the Europeans can share in the work of NATO. It is 
something that cannot hurt NATO because this is the most 
important alliance. But we think it is very important that the 
Europeans work in this manner because it is something that helps 
us in burden sharing.39 
Mrs. Albright foresaw the problems of autonomous European defense 
acting within NATO’s framework. The concerns, which she expressed, became 
known as the Three D’s.40 A European establishment of autonomous 
capabilities, especially outside the NATO framework as mentioned in the 
statement, bears the risk of a decoupling of Europe from the US. In today’s world 
marked by globalization it is not possible to decouple European security issues 
from US interests. This decoupling momentum would mainly be created by 
extensive duplication of NATO’s military structures. The national expenditures of 
European NATO members in separate forces, headquarters or infrastructure, 
which are not subsidiary to NATO’s existing resources, would constitute a waste 
of overall defense resources. This fear that Europe’s NATO members would 
waste valuable national resources in duplication of existing structures instead of 
concrete improvements in defense capabilities explained the emotional critique of 
                                            
38 Stanley Sloan, NATO,the European Union, and the Atlantic Community, (Oxford, Rowan & 
Littlefield Publisher, 2003),p.173. 
39 United States Information Agency (8 December 1998); available from http://www.usia.gov; 
internet; accessed 19 May 2004. 
40 Stanley Sloan, NATO,the European Union, and the Atlantic Community, (Oxford, Rowan & 
Littlefield Publisher, 2003),p.173. 
20 
NATO officials and US diplomats on a proposal regarding separate European 
headquarters in April 2003. During a meeting of the heads of states of France, 
Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg, the national leaders, which opposed the 
Iraq intervention, announced plans to create a joint military planning system by 
2004, and a multinational headquarters for European military operations in which 
NATO would not be involved.41 The political circumstances at this time made 
such a proposal out of question and this mini summit soon was branded as 
Pralinen Gipfel.42 Despite additional statements by Jacques Chirac that the 
proposal is not a decoupling of the EU from NATO, but a reinforcement of 
NATO’s European Pillar43, its apparent purpose was to suggest duplication of 
NATO capabilities.  
Duplication was already an issue during the Birmingham meeting of NATO 
defense ministers in October 2000. The issue was the instruments of the defense 
planning process. Since NATO uses detailed and time-consuming planning 
instruments like the Defense Planning Questionnaire, EU ministers like the 
German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping strongly proposed to drain off 
necessary information for EU purposes from this existing planning tool. This 
would avoid duplication and possible confusion with the collection of similar data 
for two different planning systems. It is no surprise that this concept was met with 
French resistance. France’s inexperience with NATO’s IMS made it difficult to 
accept too much dependency on NATO’s framework.44      
The third D addressed by Secretary Albright was discrimination. 
Discrimination in this context is the exclusion of non-EU states from EU’s 
decision making process regarding security planning. What might seem obvious 
at first, looks somewhat different when imagining the use of NATO resources for 
                                            
41 BBC NEWS World edition, (30 April 2003); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2 
/hi/europe / 2987 167.stm; internet; accessed 19 May 2004. 
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EU led missions excluding NATO members like the US, Canada or Turkey from 
the planning process.  
Turkey for example, which for a long time has tried to become a EU 
member, demanded the same openness for ESDP decision making45 as had 
existed for WEU meetings. Although not a member state, Turkey used to attend 
these meetings. France also supported by Greece, led the opposition to this 
demand trying to establish a forum free from any external influence. The same 
would be true for Eastern European NATO members as long as they were not 
EU members. The Turkish reaction to this exclusion was to blockade consensus 
within NATO on issues related to the cooperation with the EU.46 At a press 
conference following the Washington NATO summit in1999, Turkish Foreign 
Minister, Ismail Cem, was reported to have said, 
 
If EU countries want to set up their own defence organization, it is 
their business. However, when they want to use NATO’s means, 
the NATO members, including Turkey, must also be involved in 
that.47        
 
The French President Chirac clearly emphasized ESDP’s independence 
from NATO during the December 2000 meeting of heads of government at Nice, 
although he received words of warning from the US as well as from Prime 
Minister Blair and Chancellor Schroeder. Nevertheless, the Nice council meeting 
stressed its commitment for cooperation with NATO regarding the principles for 
consultation, cooperation and transparency. Furthermore, it addressed the 
necessary arrangements for an efficient EU access to NATO assets and 
capabilities. However, in situations where no NATO assets would be requested, 
the EU did not granted participation of non-EU NATO allies in the planning                                             
45 Mark Oakes, European Security and Defense Policy: Nice and beyond (London: House of 
Commons Library, 2 May 2001), p. 27; available from  http://www.parliament.uk/commons 
/lib/research/rp2001/rp01-050.pdf; internet; accessed 19 May 2004. 
46 Michael Quinlan, European Defense Cooperation (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center 
Press, 2001),  p . 47. 
47 Mark Oakes, European Security and Defense Policy: Nice and beyond (London: House of 
Commons Library, 2 May 2001), p. 28; available from  http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/ 
research/rp2001/rp01-050.pdf; internet; accessed 19 may 2004. 
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process. Non-EU NATO allies’ participation would be limited to liaison officers 
exchanging information on operational planning. The concern was that the EU 
would start serious planning efforts before consulting NATO. This however, is in 
contrary to the EU’s claim to concentrate on operations “where NATO as a whole 
is not engaged.48 As a result, the perception of the ESDP remained ambivalent in 
non-EU countries, especially the US.     
US Senators Jesse Helms and Gordon Smith expressed American 
suspicion that ESDP will rival NATO for supremacy in European security affairs. 
After the EU's Nice summit they warned that "European leaders should reflect 
carefully on the true motivation behind ESDP, which many see as a means for 
Europe to check American power and influence within NATO." The two Senators 
Helms and Smith continued to warn that "it is neither in Europe's nor America's 
interests to undermine our proven national relationship in favor of one with a 




C. THE IRAQ CRISIS 2002-2003; IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO’S 
COHESION 
The suspicion of a European counterbalance to US security policy and the 
US influence in NATO reached its climax during the discussions over the US led 
operation against Iraq in 2002-2003. The provocative demonstrations of various 
to the Iraqi issue on both sides of the Atlantic also affected NATO. France and 
Germany, two of Europe’s big three, opposed the creation of a “coalition of the 
willing” and the US proclamation to act unilateral if necessary. Although NATO 
was not involved directly, the discrepancies among major members of NATO 
regarding this security issue had certain impact on NATO’s reputation. Obviously, 
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NATO as the primary organization for security was not able to generate 
consensus among its members concerning the potential of Iraqi threat. Although, 
a general consensus existed concerning the need to support the UN resolution, 
the question of by what means still remained. 
NATO Allies stand united in their commitment to take effective 
action to assist and support the efforts of the UN to ensure full and 
immediate compliance by Iraq, without conditions or restrictions, 
with UNSCR 1441.50 
 
NATO’s member countries formed coalitions of common interests outside 
of the NATO framework. The US underscored its position by emphasizing its 
support from European countries like Britain and Spain. In addition, the US led 
coalition found support among the new NATO members like Poland. NATO did 
not serve as the framework to establish a common position among its members 
on the Iraq crisis, but was used as a pool of forces available to create ad hoc 
coalitions outside of NATO.  
France, fearing it would lose influence regarding its permanent seat on the 
UN Security Council and Germany, being torn apart over the Iraqi question in the 
middle of a election campaign, expressed their opposition by ruling out any 
compromises long before it would have been necessary.  
France saw its international influence steadily decreasing with the growing 
US willingness to act even without a new mandate by the UN Security Council. 
France interpretation of the existing mandate did not sanction the US plans for 
military intervention. The same interpretation was expressed by Chancellor 
Gerhard Schroeder in a speech to the German parliament. 
Resolution 1441 does not contain any automatism to the use of 
military force. The priority task is to exhaust all resources for 
peaceful conflict resolution and optimize their use.51 
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Chancellor Schroeder continued that the transatlantic relationship won't be 
undermined by occasional differences of opinion. 
 
We are united by a friendship that is based on mutual respect and 
the pursuit of common aims. And which therefore must withstand 
differences of opinion on important issues. Today's dispute is not 
about details of security policy. Nor about apparent strategic or 
economic benefits. And certainly not about the 'to be or not to be' of 
NATO.52 
 
Since France’s influence in the NATO arena was too weak vis-à-vis the 
US, Chirac used the European forum to support an opposition.  
 
Europe must realize the need to express its own vision of world 
problems and support this vision with a credible common defense. 
France is calling on her partners in the European Union and those 
going to join it to fulfill this ambition, in the service of peace and 
prosperity.53 
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III. FRANCE 
A. FRANCE’S QUEST FOR AN INDEPENDENT EUROPEAN DEFENSE 
1. The Origin of France’s Desire for an Independent European 
Defense  
The intangible phenomenon of France’s search for prestige is firmly 
intertwined with the French policy regarding its role as a major power in Europe 
and overseas. The roots of modern French grandeur are influenced by the 
persistent menacing of the powerful German Empire in continental Europe and 
the British dominance as a nation that projects power worldwide. France superior 
role on the European continent was abruptly displaced by Germany in the 
Franco-Prussian War in 1870-1871.54 The loss of the provinces of Alsace and 
Lorraine to Germany had a significant impact on French national pride. The 
French reaction to compensate for this loss was to divert its attention to the 
struggle for overseas colonies. In 1897, German Kaiser Wilhelm II followed 
Britain and France with his “place in the sun” policy challenging Anglo-French 
imperial interests in Africa and Asia. 
The loss of French territory in 1871, the challenge by Germany overseas 
and the devastating defeat of France in two World Wars manifested the desire in 
French policy for sovereignty, independence and military strength. The Second 
World War left France as a ruined country. Obviously, France was far from 
accomplishing any of these objectives. In contrast it became highly dependent on 
the US and was even forced to compromise with the reestablishment of Germany 
as a European power. As a result of this long period of tension between France 
and Germany, the French relationship with Germany since 1945 shows 
alternating elements of distrust, dependence and a special obligation to secure 
peace between the two nations. 
Hence, the French position regarding European security and defense has 
for decades differed from that of Germany and UK. The French national interest 
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after World War II was dominated by two objectives: first, to ensure that Germany 
would never again develop military forces which could threaten France and, 
second, to protect France against the rising Soviet threat in Europe. 
Although NATO was the appropriate organization to achieve those goals, 
the French perception of the Atlantic Alliance was that it was dominated by the 
Anglo-American relationship. Since France was excluded from the initial 
negotiations, this perception aggravated it even further. France continued to 
claim to be the third leader of the Alliance. Examples are the French demand for 
the creation of a tripartite chief of staff, which would give France influence in the 
strategic planning process. The marginalization of the Standing Group as an 
executive organ, which gave France a limited say in strategic issues, the 
imbalance with the national feeling regarding the control of NATO’s major 
command55 and finally the confrontation with the US during the Suez crisis of 
195656 made France a reluctant ally to NATO, from the beginning. 
 
The principal victim of the (Suez) affair was the Atlantic Pact. If our 
allies could abandon us under difficult, if not dramatic, 
circumstances, they were able of doing it again if Europe, in turn, 
was threatened.57    
 
At least, NATO gave France the necessary guarantees against the threat 
of Soviet aggression or coercion. The alliance with UK and the strong US 
commitment to the NATO allies provided some assurance about Germany in 
addition to the continuing occupation regime. French political leaders were 
alarmed when West German rearmament became an essential factor for NATO’s 
defense against the Soviet Union. The main US Joint Emergency War Plan 
(EWP) in 1948 was called Halfmoon. The plan predicted the Soviet Union to be 
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able to sweep to the English Channel in 60 days or less, within 200 days most of 
Turkey, Iraq and Iran would be overrun. A retreat behind the Pyrenees would be 
the Western Allies last foothold on the continent for a massive Normandy-type 
counterattack. It is obvious that such a plan engendered more hostile attention 
from the continental Europeans than from Americans, Canadians or British.58 
Especially during the Korean War (1950-1953), the US and most other NATO 
countries feared Soviet aggression in Europe. Since the French armed forces 
were still weak and engaged in combat in Indochina the Federal Republic of 
Germany and France further perceived the British commitment in continental 
Europe as reserved, German rearmament became a requirement for the alliance, 
rather than an expression of national choice.59 The NAC meeting in Lisbon in 
February 1952 proposed the so-called Lisbon goals. Although unrealizable, the 
goal relied on major contributions of conventional forces by the member-states, 
including 12 divisions from the Federal Republic of Germany within an all-
European army.60  This was obviously in strong contrast to the dominant French 
conception of national interest at that time and brought the first major 
disagreement between France and its NATO allies, especially with the US. 
France certainly recognized the need for stronger military resources and 
developed an alternative concept, which would permit the establishment of West 
German armed forces, but not under national German control. France’s Prime 
Minister Renè Pleven proposed in October 1950 a plan to integrate German 
battalions under control of a supranational structure.61 The idea was German 
participation on the battalion level in a European army without a German General 
Staff and without any German divisions. The forces themselves would operate 
under a European defense minister.  
The US had especially pushed for a modification of the plan and 
eventually a compromise in the form of the European Defense Community (EDC)                                             
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was agreed upon. In May 1952 France, West Germany, Italy and the Benelux 
states signed the EDC treaty.62 
NATO’s February 1952 Lisbon final communiqué stressed that this 
European Defense Community would operate within the NATO framework.63 The 
reason why the French National Assembly chose not to ratify the EDC treaty in 
1954 was based on the culmination of several changes in France’s security 
environment. The likelihood of a direct military attack from the Soviet Union 
gradually decreased after Stalin's death in early 1953. Détente remained a long 
way off, but the Cold War was entering a phase of greater stability in Europe. At 
the same time France felt increasingly excluded from the decision making 
process by Britain and the US. Germany, overcoming initial fear of a revival of 
national militarism, used its strategic importance to demand equal treatment. The 
French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman wrote in 1951 “Germany would either 
dominate the European army – the flower of the French army was dying in 
Indochina – or throw it over to pursue a militarist-revanchist course.”64 
What influence the Soviet Union had on the failed ratification of the treaty 
is uncertain, but William Hyland, a former US government official and observer of 
the Soviet Union, claimed that the Soviets also sought to block EDC by promising 
to help France in its negotiations with the communist Vietnamese guerrillas if 
France would refuse to ratify the EDC treaty.65 
However, the most significant reason for France to reject EDC might have 
been the basic concept behind a military defense community. The US perception 
of EDC was to weld the European armies together, especially France and 
Germany. In contrast, France sought to create with EDC an instrument to 
integrate German military resources while limiting German control. French critics 
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argued that EDC would reconstitute German armed forces, while subordinating 
the French military to a supranational European organization.66  
 
The fundamental fact of all these tortuous negotiations spreading 
over nearly four years is that all the French governments from the 
end of 1950 till the actual rejection of EDC in 1954, knew that at no 
time was there a majority in the National Assembly or in the country 
to sanction EDC67     
 
The remarkable aspects of the EDC episode include France’s proposal for 
a parallel but independent European defense structure and the strong Anglo-
American concept of European defense within the NATO framework. Although 
EDC failed, it paved the way for Germany’s admission to the WEU and NATO. 
The dilemma of collective European defense was significantly affected by 
the triangular relationship between the US, France and Germany.68 Germany’s 
promising economic strength and its geo-strategic location made it a prospective 
partner in Europe. France as well as the US were both continually trying to gain 
influence over Germany. In its own struggle for sovereignty via international 
integration, Germany was often able to exploit this competition to achieve a 
bargaining position well beyond its actual power. This was clearly evident during 
the Fifth Republic, President Charles de Gaulle pressed impatiently for 
Germany’s acceptance of an “exclusive association” between France and 
Germany. De Gaulle even demanded that Germany should support a joined 
proposal for a “French hegemony” in Western Europe.69  
Despite this competition, all three nations were well aware that because of 
their dependence on each other a productive relationship was not possible 
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without reconciliation. Consequently, Germany often took over the role of a 
mediator balancing the interests of France and the US.    
Half a century later, France is again the strongest promoter of a more 
independent European defense, this time via the European Union. Since the 
Cold War did not offer enough scope to develop the French “Third Way”, NATO 
was the preferred organization to protect France’s national security interests. 
With the end of the Cold War, France is in a position to resume its pursuit of an 
independent European defense with strong French influence. The orientations of 
the ESDP satisfy the longstanding French desire to create autonomous 
European defense capacities outside of NATO. In contrast, the French 
considered the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), which was the 
concept of European defense cooperation within the NATO framework, an 
"Americanization" of the European Pillar instead of a true path toward an 
autonomous ESDP. France’s effort regarding the ESDP shows clearly an old 
pattern of weakening the transatlantic link and especially US influence in Europe 
in favor of an autonomous European defense.  
 
2. France Still as a Grand Nation; the French “Third Way” 
French diplomacy is strongly influenced by the ideology of independence 
and grandeur. 70 Grandeur in the French perspective is based not only on the 
nation’s status as a great European power among others (UK, Prussia, Austria-
Hungary and Russia during the 18th-19th centuries), but also on convictions about 
the universal relevance of French values. In the context of the decolonization of 
Algeria (1956-1962), for example, President de Gaulle presented France’s revival 
and recovery of African independence as a symbol for other countries in a 
pluralistic international system.71 French foreign policy is seen as a contribution 
to the enlightenment of the world. 
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French values were especially challenged by the sudden dominance of 
the US in military and economic affairs. The dependence on the US was 
interpreted as a loss of Frenchness.72 The election of General Charles de Gaulle 
as president was an expression of France’s struggle to regain its former 
grandeur. The Fifth Republic tried to develop a Third Way (1958-1969) to stay 
independent in the relationship between the US and the Soviet Union. This 
development during the Cold War period, which saw some tendencies of anti-
Americanism among the intellectual elite, found its infamous climax in the French 
withdrawal from NATO’s integrated command structure in 1966.73 Despite 
France’s rapprochement with NATO’s military structures in 1995-1996, a certain 
reserve is still visible in Chirac’s statement that France approaches NATO with 
an open mind “as long as the European identity can assert itself fully therein.”74     
One important aspect of independence is national defense. Besides the 
obvious reason for national defense, namely the state’s protection against 
external aggression, it is a symbol of the government’s authority and 
legitimacy.75 This notion of national defense leads to an inherently ambiguous 
understanding of the European Union’s security and defense policy. The 
promotion of the Saint-Mâlo process (1998) may lead to stronger French 
influence in the ESDP and lessen the extent of US dominance in European 
security affairs. Reaching this goal implies the containment of arrangements that 
would “Europeanize” such national military capabilities, as those proposed by 
Germany.76 While Germany has advocated a federalist model for the European 
Union, France has favored centralized alternatives, which would strengthen EU 
institutions without limiting French national autonomy.  
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France’s contemporary policy regarding collective defense is still 
influenced by its national experience from 1870 to 1945. Its ambivalent status in 
NATO and its commitment to the European Union’s ESDP reflect French national 
identity. The following two chapters focus on France's interaction with NATO and 
its military commitment to collective defense.  
 
B. FRANCE’S SPECIAL STATUS WITHIN NATO  
1. France and the NATO Integrated Military Structure 
Although the importance of independent decision-making was already a 
characteristic of the Fourth Republic (1946-1958)77, the French notion of 
grandeur is usually connected to the expression of Gaullism. Hence, the most 
significant impulse to the French approach to national security affairs came 
during de Gaulle’s presidency during the Fifth Republic (1958-1969). 
In his first Defense Council meeting as President, de Gaulle addressed France’s 
status within NATO. 
Our place in the NATO organization must be reconsidered. The 
Americans enjoy an overwhelming number of commands in the 
organization. We are the victims of a completely unacceptable 
discrimination… We are completely left to one side when it comes 
to drawing up the plans for the SAC and the British Bomber 
Command (SACEUR) possess military assets over whose use we 
have no say whatsoever. We cannot accept such exclusivity 
concerning nuclear war, especially because our territory would be 
used.78 
  
 On 17 September 1958, de Gaulle addressed a memorandum to 
President Eisenhower demanding that the area of competence of NATO should 
be enlarged (including France’s conflict in Algeria) and that a tripartite directorate 
separate from NATO should be set up comprised of France, the US and the 
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UK.79 De Gaulle was not successful in persuading Eisenhower with his 
memorandum and began to reduce French participation in NATO.80  
De Gaulle’s main objective was to create a French sense of common 
purpose through national symbols and consequently to create united France.81 In 
his view, the control of military power was one of the decisive principles of 
sovereignty. The French armed forces fought under French authority for the  
nation of France. Such an integrated command structure as NATO “deprived the 
military of its sense of supreme responsibility to France, thereby damaging its 
reliability and usefulness to anyone.”82 De Gaulle’s alliance policy was 
consequently based on national freedom of decision. His concept was that the 
alliance as an instrument of statecraft should serve national aims and that 
sovereign nations should be free to undertake independent actions if this suits 
their interests. Nevertheless, France was certainly able to make compromises to 
achieve its goals. In 1950 France advocated the creation of a unified command 
for NATO in the form of a tripartite chief of staff (“Standing Group”), because this 
would increase French influence in Anglo-American strategic planning. In 
addition, French direct participation in NATO’s strategic planning would serve 
France’s interests in postponing the urgent question of German rearmament.83 
Soon, the French disapproved the concept of integrated military command, since 
it placed a sizeable proportion of French troops under the supreme command of 
a US officer.84  
With de Gaulle’s presidency this condition became unacceptable, taking 
the already mentioned notion of French sovereignty into account. In 1959 France 
refused the deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons on its soil. In the same 
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year France withdrew its Mediterranean fleet and 1963 its Atlantic fleet from the 
NATO command. Most NATO members interpreted this move as only the 
prelude to a French proposal for a transfer of decision-making authority to the 
European members. Instead, in March 1966 de Gaulle announced the complete 
withdrawal of French forces from the integrated NATO command structure and 
demanded the removal of NATO headquarters as well as US and Canadian 
soldiers from French soil.85 Those decisions stressed French sovereignty, but not 
a break with NATO overall. France still remained on NATO’s political councils. 
Basically, this move had more impact on the political cohesion of NATO than on 
its military strength. The integrated military structure placed relatively little 
authority into the hands of the SACEUR during peacetime. Only certain forces, 
as communication forces, standing naval forces, Airborne Early Warning or 
nuclear weapon systems on quick reaction alert were under the SACEUR’s 
peacetime command. Most of the forces of NATO members remained under 
national control. Additional forces were placed under NATO command only 
through an explicit transfer of authority from the national command to NATO.86  
In addition, the French withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military 
structure had to be seen in the context of the development of French nuclear 
forces. France’s strategy was to buy time until its nuclear arsenal was 
operational, on the assumption that this would enable France to discuss 
organizational changes in NATO on more equal terms.87 During the Cold War the 
French nuclear forces were never part of NATO cooperation and always created 
a factor of uncertainty. France was certainly aware of the fact that its forces, 
including its nuclear capabilities, were autonomously not able to defend France 
against a Soviet threat. The withdrawal from NATO’s military structure 
established a special role for France in NATO. France achieved a high level of 
independence from NATO without greatly jeopardizing its security. A poignant 
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example is after its withdrawal, France refused to accept the responsibility of 
defending a specified sector in the combined defense effort of NATO forces on 
the East/West divide and emphasized that French contributions to the forward 
battle in Germany would not be automatic.88 
France’s disappointing experience with its US and British allies during 
World War II led to the Ailleret-Lemnitzer agreements89, which saw France as an 
ally rather than a part of an integrated military force. This included the national 
freedom to judge the conditions in which France would contribute forces.90    
While de Gaulle’s alliance policy became characteristic of France, 
beginning in the 1980’s, it became obvious that France’s political leaders were 
deadlocked with the “Gaullist legacy”. The apparent impossibility to abandon this 
false appearance of consensus and risk a crisis in French domestic policy led to 
a period of stagnancy called “Immobilisme”.91   
The changed security environment after 1990 made clear that France’s 
policies toward NATO were increasingly out of touch with the changed European 
security system. Although France recognized the need for a new impulse to take 
a larger role in European security, it could only achieve more international 
influence through the resources of the NATO structures. France, for example, 
welcomed the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept as a short-term 
solution to take part in NATO-led missions without giving up independence. 
Following a series of agreements regarding cooperation between France and 
NATO, France announced in 1995 as a symbolic and substantive step its return 
to the NATO Military Committee and its attendance at NAC meetings involving 
defense ministers. Unfortunately, this French rapprochement with NATO’s IMS 
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came to a sudden stop in fall 1996, when the negotiations of Jacques Chirac and 
its Prime Minister Alain Juppe over the French demand for the position of 
CINCSOUTH failed.  
An example of accepting NATO’s role as a vehicle to increase Europe’s 
influence on the international scene is the Kosovo conflict in 1999.  
Even if there were doubts in the mind of some French, German and 
Italian policy-makers about the nature and means to resolve the 
Kosovo conflict, they were not inclined to distance themselves from 
the line pursued in London and Washington for fear of missing an 
historical chance to realize a more independent European 
defense.92 
   France, whose opposition to the Iraq war in 2002-2003 damaged its 
relationship with Washington, now sees NATO as the only vehicle to project its 
own military and political power and repair its ties with American. In January 
2004, the US quietly welcomed two French one-star generals into NATO's 
command, one at alliance headquarters in Mons, Belgium, and the other in 
Norfolk, USA. NATO’s supreme commander in Europe, General Jones, pushed 
hard for the administration to grant the French request so that the two generals 
be placed, but the issue was so divisive that the US president himself had to 
make the final decision.93 In his memoirs de Gaulle noted that his aim was not to 




2. French Participation in NATO-led Operations  
The changed security environment after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact 
gave France the chance to increase its political influence without the former 
constraints of the East West confrontation. France had to recognize that NATO 
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was and still is the most effective organization to deal with security affairs in the 
Euro-Atlantic region. French support for the CJTF concept as well as the idea of 
a European defense identity within NATO was a way to take a defining role in 
European security and at the same time minimize US influence. Nevertheless, 
French participation in NATO missions has been far from accepting US 
dominance.  
French participation during the Bosnia missions (1995-1996) and the 
Kosovo missions (1999) demonstrated how differently France and the US 
approached the conflict. Differences became visible over the general framework 
and form of the intervention as well as over the extent of the involvement.95 In 
1993, France and other European countries called for US forces to intervene 
militarily in Bosnia since UNPROFOR was not adequately prepared for the 
situation. At the same time, France and other European countries tried to 
constrain the US forces with the legal framework of the United Nations.96 
France’s 1995 announcement of rapprochement with NATO was a result of the 
obvious military limitations of the European defense capabilities. France needed 
NATO’s capabilities as a vehicle for its role as one of the leading European 
powers.    
France has not been part of NATO's military command structure 
since de Gaulle, on a campaign to assert France's military 
autonomy, withdrew from it in 1966. Now, with about 2,000 troops 
in the first rotation of the 6,000-troop NATO Response Force, 
France is the force's largest contributor of troops.97 
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C. FRANCE’S MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO NATO AND TO EUROPEAN 
DEFENSE 
1. Bilateral Commitments with Germany 
France and Germany’s way to overcome their traditional antagonism was 
to pursue close cooperation on many levels. The European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC)98 in 1950 was as much a mutual security system as an 
economic arrangement. Giving control over important war industries to a 
supranational agency the ECSC was limiting the possible threat of German war 
preparation.    
The ECDC can be seen as the first step of an intensive development of 
the Franco-German defense and security cooperation. The intensity of relations 
between Germany and France regarding the promotion of a European defense 
has varied as a reaction to developments in transatlantic ties. The US change 
from the strategy of massive retaliation to Flexible Response during the Kennedy 
administration was perceived in Europe as a weakening of the US pledge to 
deter a Soviet conventional attack with nuclear retaliation.99  In the shadow of 
this discord, West Germany attempted to improve its security cooperation with 
the nuclear power capabilities of France. In 1963, France and West Germany 
signed the Elysèe treaty, which was supposed to be the foundation for a special 
bilateral relationship.100 This bilateral agreement focused on regular defense 
meetings, the exchange of military personnel and the cooperation in arms 
production.101 Despite the French aspiration of isolating European defense from 
the US, the West German government did not ratify the treaty without a 
preamble, which expressed West Germany’s unwavering commitment to NATO. 
The French saw in this preamble a betrayal of the European concept they had 
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intended to promote. The succeeding chancellor Ludwig Erhard promoted a 
much closer relationship with Washington and established German influence in 
NATO’s nuclear doctrine through the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG).  
Although the expectations associated with the Elysée treaty were high, it 
was overshadowed by the French “two battle” concept. France made a clear 
distinction between the forward battle on the territory of West Germany in which 
the French conventional forces would act as a reserve for NATO and the battle 
for France, which was obviously the decisive defense for France. This battle for 
France would include French nuclear defense. Even the bilateral military staff 
talks between Germany and France agreed upon in the Elysée treaty did not 
change this French strategy.102  
It was not until the late 1970’s and early 1980’s that Franco-German 
defense cooperation made progress again. One major reason for French 
cooperation with West Germany was its fear that West Germany could fall victim 
to growing pacifist, neutralist and anti-nuclear movements. Under Kohl and 
Mitterrand the defense clause of the Elysée treaty was implemented. This 
included the establishment of a Franco-German Commission on Security and 
Defense.103 In 1988 a Defense and Security Council was established. An even 
clearer sign of intense cooperation was the French creation of the Force d’Action 
Rapide (FAR).104 This 47,000 strong force was intended to improve the French 
capability to act more cooperatively with NATO in the forward defense of West 
Germany. The compatibility with German forces was tested during a large 
bilateral exercise in 1987 called Kecker Spatz. France insisted on conducting the 
exercise on a strictly bilateral basis without NATO observers, even though this  
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scenario was highly artificial. The exercise revealed problems regarding 
compatibility, logistics and the French application of NATO plans and 
procedures.105  
In 1987 the Franco-German defense cooperation led to the establishment 
of a 4,200 man Franco-German brigade under the command of the French-
German Defense Council. Although this force had questionable military 
capabilities, it represented the French objective to improve its status regarding 
European defense through an alternative to NATO. Despite France’s official 
commitment to NATO, the French rhetoric contained the message that Paris 
wished to improve the influence of NATO’s European Pillar through an enhanced 
French role. “France must play a more active role at the heart of the Atlantic 
Alliance in order that the latter can become an Alliance between equals.”106 
France’s chance to play a larger role resided in the strengthening of European 
military structures. 
In 1987 German chancellor, Helmut Kohl, and French president, François 
Mitterrand, agreed on the formation of a Franco-German brigade to be stationed 
in southwest Germany, but with headquarters in Strasbourg, France.  While the 
Franco-German brigade was France’s way to compensate for conventional 
military deficiencies through its West German partner in the Cold War scenario, 
the establishment of the Euro-Corps was, in contrast, a way to adapt to the new 
security environment. While the UK, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Denmark 
rejected the idea of a stronger link between the WEU and the EU, France and 
Germany hoped that the expansion of the Franco-German brigade, formed in 
1987, would improve military cooperation between the WEU members, develop a 
role for the WEU and build a European crisis intervention force.107 France and 
Germany sought to make the WEU subordinate to the EU. 
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In May 1992, Kohl and Mitterrand announced the establishment of the 
Euro-Corps. All the states of the Western European Union were invited to 
participate. Three possible missions were identified, first, the deployment under 
NATO control in time of war, second, peacemaking and peacekeeping operations 
under WEU command in places outside the NATO treaty area which were 
subject to constitutional limits on German troop deployments and third, 
employment for humanitarian purposes abroad. 
The problem was no longer solely French deficiencies in conventional 
forces, but an entire European military deficiency in all aspects of modern 
warfare.  It is certainly no coincidence that the purely European Euro-Corps was 
established at the same time NATO adjusted itself to the new challenges with the 
creation of the multinational Allied Command Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) 
under a British commander (June 1991).108 The creation of the ARRC had 
significant advantages for the UK since it could maintain its military presence on 
the continent, modernize its forces and withstand further cutbacks of British 
forces. 
French and Spanish officials saw in the development of the ARRC 
as an attempt by the UK and the US to use the Alliance for their 
own out-of-area operations and thus reassert their dominance with 
the organization.109 
 
The Euro-Corps was based on multinational force assignments by France, 
Germany, Spain, Belgium and Luxembourg. The Corps numbers approximately 
60,000 soldiers. The multinational staff is led by a commander who post rotates 
between the contributing countries. A French official responded to the US 
reproach of trying to get rid of NATO by saying,  
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The US administration cannot have it both ways: it cannot demand 
that Europe shoulder more of the defense burden and take more 
military risks and, simultaneously, insist that the driver’s seat 
belongs exclusively to NATO and Washington.110  
 
As leading partners of the Euro-Corps project, neither Germany nor 
France wanted to get rid of NATO. This was quite clear in a statement made on 
November 30, 1992,  
 
France and Germany announced that the Euro-Corps could be 
placed under NATO command, in the case of an attack on the 
alliance or of a decision by NATO governments to dispatch a 
peacekeeper force outside alliance territory. On January 21, 1993, 
an official agreement was signed on the terms of cooperation 
between NATO and the Euro-Corps, thus ending fears that the 
Euro-Corps would undermine NATO.111 
 
 
Nevertheless, a certain French and German reluctance to the strong 
involvement of the UK in the ARRC concept remained, due to longstanding 
relationships previously established in NATO.  
The concept had a notion of being reaffirmation of the traditional 
Anglo-American special relationship and its hegemonic role in 
NATO. Partly for these reasons, France and Germany sought to 
enhance the EC role in defense by arguing that the EC should 
develop a European defense identity by integrating in its treaty 
some of the functions undertaken by the WEU.112   
 
A significant symbol of Franco-German defense cooperation was the 1986 
declaration by Mitterrand that France would consult West Germany in case of the 
potential use of nuclear weapons. Although he noted that such a decision cannot 
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be shared, he assured the chancellor that France would consult West Germany 
on the deployment of nuclear weapons on German territory.113    
 
2. The French Nuclear Forces  
The French desire for nuclear weapons was always the expression of an 
aspiration for an autonomous defense capability. France as a permanent 
member of the United Nation Security Council was expected to obtain nuclear 
weapons due to domestic pressure.114 France claimed the right to an 
independent national nuclear deterrent policy and during the Cold War its nuclear 
capability was often seen as a source of legitimacy for its claim to be the third 
world power besides the US and the USSR. The US did not support the nuclear 
weapons program in France since those nuclear forces were not compatible with 
the Flexible Response doctrine. Allied nuclear forces were seen as expensive, 
not credible as a deterrent, and usable only as a first strike option.115 The 
doctrine of Flexible Response led to uncertainties among European countries. 
While massive retaliation against any Soviet aggression would involve the US 
directly, Flexible Response could lead to a European conventional battlefield 
without a strategic nuclear exchange. The result could be the destruction of 
Europe. The European countries could be subject to the mercy of American 
strategic decisions.116  
In 1964 a report of the National Defense Committee of the French 
National Assembly stressed that France wanted “to be able to deny the great 
powers the delights of conventional war on the soil of Western Europe.”117 Due 
to the increased doubts in Europe concerning Kennedy’s Flexible Response and 
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the credibility of the US nuclear commitment to European defense, the concept of 
a Multilateral Force (MLF) was proposed to establish allied nuclear participation 
under Washington’s direction. The final proposal for the MLF in 1963 consisted of 
a multinational manned fleet of 25 surface ships armed with nuclear Polaris 
missiles. Although those ships would have been under SACEUR’s command, the 
decision to fire the missiles would have been made in consensus by the 
participating countries.118  Certainly, France did not appreciate the perspective of 
German nuclear capabilities through MLF.119 The French concerns were brought 
directly to Kennedy’s attention regarding the risk of a German desire to become a 
nuclear power. The French perceived the MLF proposal as more or less directed 
against France. The French newspaper La Nation already suggested in 1964 that  
France’s reaction could be to withdraw French forces from NATO.120      
The French notion of nuclear weapons as a guarantee of strategic 
independence still exists today. Today’s French concept of nuclear deterrence 
does not include the usage of these weapons as a mean of coercion. Nuclear 
weapons are political instruments intended to provide “existential deterrence” in 
contrast to the French Cold War strategy of “pre-strategic” options, which was 
close to the concept of Flexible Response.121 French nuclear capability has not 
been directed against any country in particular since the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
but the French considered it an additional attribute of the EU’s power. Extensive 
coordination was conducted with the UK on a common strategic doctrine. From 
1995 to 1997, France used the expression “concerted deterrence” to emphasize 
its interest in European collaboration. A clear definition of how such a European 
strategy would have influence over French nuclear weapons is missing. The 
increasing speed of European defense unity in the form of the ESDP will sooner 
or later tackle the question of a common European nuclear capability.  
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The relationship between France and NATO was ambiguous from the 
beginning. France’s notion of its former grandeur as one of the great European 
powers was damaged by the German occupation during World War II and its 
obvious weakness in the post-war period. France was completely dependent on 
the collective defense guarantee by the US. On the other hand, the French 
perception of national sovereignty was not able to accept the resulting 
dominance of a US influence over the alliance.  
French weakness became even more unbearable since its former enemy 
Germany was able to achieve a significant role in NATO’s defense. For decades 
France has been fighting a battle on two fronts. France considers itself a 
sovereign power equal to the US. Consequently, it is in a continuous struggle to 
balance US dominance in security affairs. Neither a seat as a permanent 
member of the UN Security council with veto power vis-à-vis the other nuclear 
powers nor the presidency of the former World War II General de Gaulle helped 
to develop the French strategic culture in a more realistic framework. In addition, 
France sees itself as the leading continental European power. Not only does 
France have to balance the US influence in European affairs, it also has to 
balance the rising influence of Germany in Europe. Although the German 
recovery was tolerated, France’s objective was and still is to control its powerful 
neighbor.  
France’s ambiguous relationship with NATO over the past 55 years 
demonstrates the French realization that NATO is the only guarantee for 
collective defense and currently the only military organization for France to 
participate effectively in European security. Since the French proposal for EDC, 
France has used the idea of an independent European defense to minimize US 
influence in Europe and control German power. The French withdrawal from 
NATO’s military structure, the development of nuclear weapons and the French 
opposition to the US-led “coalition of the willing” are examples of France’s 
objective. It is remarkable that France obviously finds a perfect balance of 
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pushing its independence from NATO while never fundamentally jeopardizing the 
transatlantic guarantees. Periods of French opposition have been followed by 
French-NATO rapprochement.  
France is not able to create a European substitute for NATO all by itself, 
and its European partners are unwilling to support a duplication of NATO’s 
military capabilities. Consequently, France will continue to play its role as a 






A. NATO AS GERMANY’S GUARANTEE FOR SOVEREIGNTY AND 
UNITY 
 
Together with France, Germany led the opposition to the invasion of the 
Iraq 2003. Germany’s chancellor Gerhard Schröder, leader of the Social 
Democrats (SPD), used the question of German participation in the US-led 
operation as a main topic during his reelection campaign in 2002122. Although the 
German public opinion was divided on this subject addressing this issue was 
sufficient enough to win the election with a slight advantage. The public opinion 
in Germany was clearly in favor of a peaceful solution to the Iraqi problem 
without the use of military means. However, a Gallup poll, one month after the 
election, showed a change of public opinion in favor of the Christian Democratic 
opposition (CDU-CSU), which supported the US.123   
US diplomats like the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld harshly 
criticized this German opposition to an intervention in Iraq. Despite some 
European opposition, the US was able to build a ““coalition of the willing”” 
including some of the new NATO members like Poland. Certain rhetoric was 
used to play down the opposition of the two dominant countries in Europe. To 
avoid the impression that Europe as a whole was opposing US plans, US 
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld called Germany a part of the “Old Europe”124.  
Germany’s decision against a military intervention in the Iraq and its 
decision to accept the risk of irritating the US have to be seen in context with 
Germany’s historical background. Germany’s experiences during and after World 
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War II, the special relationship with the US and the special friendship with its 
former archenemy France were the precondition to mobilize German opposition 
against any unilateral military action on the international scene. 
Despite the US-German discord, Germany’s position towards NATO as 
the primary organization for security in Europe remained unchanged. 
 
From a German perspective, opposition to the war in Iraq reflects a 
legitimate, but limited disagreement with the United States. It is a 
policy issue and does not affect the German-American friendship. 
There are many reasons why Germany is so reluctant to use 
military force, the strongest being its history of warfare and 
militarization, and ultimately German responsibility for World War II 
and the Holocaust. The post war generation in Germany thinks of 
any kind of war as a catastrophe.125 
 
To be included in international structures has been a main objective of 
Germany and German policy since the end of World War II. Further European 
unification, which consequently includes a unification of the ESDP are seen as a 
parallel and supportive development to NATO. Germany’s policy is based on 
close international relations and international institutions to prevent any form of 
unilateralism by Germany itself or any other nation.126 
This perception of international relations makes it difficult for Germany to 
join so-called “coalitions of the willing”. This was evident during the Iraq crisis of 
2002-2003 with the absence of a clear consensus within NATO or the United 
Nation’s Security Council. Even under circumstances with a clear consensus 
within NATO or the UN, Germany needed a long time to develop a more realistic 
policy regarding the use of military force. After the Cold War, Germany was 
repeatedly pressured to take more responsibility in “out of area” operations. 
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Although an important shift in German security policy has taken place since 
1991, a substantial reservation to its growing military role has remained. This 
reluctance was supported by the prevailing interpretation of the Basic German 
Law that the German armed forces can only be used in defense of Germany or 
its allies or in humanitarian operations. The “out-of-area” discussion was 
especially taboo in German political culture.127  
 
In Bonn there was a belief that no policies should be pursued that 
could arouse suspicions in the Soviet Union and in East Europe 
that Germany was seeking to expand its military capabilities. For 
these reasons German government officials did not express an 
opinion toward the NATO’s out-of-area issue during 1990.128 
 
 It took until July 1994, when the Federal Constitutional Court agreed on a 
new interpretation of the Law.  
 
German leaders will continue to place particular emphasis on the 
search for non-military solutions, insisting that the Bundeswehr be 
deployed only as a last resort. Where Germany does intervene 
militarily, it will do so only as part of a multilateral coalition and only 
where a clear international mandate exists. And such actions will be 
justified many more often than not in terms of Germany’s 
responsibilities and obligation rather than its national interests.129 
 
 
The following chapters illustrate the origin of Germany’s desire for close 
partnership in European defense, namely ESDP, without jeopardizing the US 
commitment to Atlantic security, which has characterized Germany’s 
development since 1945.   
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1. West-Germany’s Armament; NATO, EDC and the WEU 
The German post war period encountered a movement for the strong 
rejection of military force. The experience of World War II represented the most 
striking lesson of the German use of military force. Anti-militarism and pacifism 
acquired strong roots in Germany.130 In September 1950, the US Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson demanded German rearmament as a precondition for 
continuous US military commitment in Europe, not only many Europeans, but a 
significant proportion of Germans opposed his proposal.131 Parts of the German 
population were reluctant to engage in military commitments or even to 
contribute to armed forces. In contrast to German politicians like Kurt 
Schumacher leader of the SPD, who demanded a neutral and unified Germany, 
the first post war chancellor Konrad Adenauer (CDU) was realist enough to 
foresee Germany’s future in a strong western alliance with the western powers. 
Adenauer was able to use Germany’s economic and military potential to bargain 
for German sovereignty regarding the division of Germany and its significance to 
the developments of the Cold War.  
The US recognized the necessity to integrate the occupied western part of 
Germany partly due to economic reasons, but also as military resource against 
the rising Soviet threat. The events in Korea (June 1950) demonstrated the 
urgency to reinforce conventional military defense in Europe. It became obvious 
that a similar process of communist aggression as in Korea could happen in 
Germany and jeopardize Europe as a whole. The still young NATO organization 
was not strong enough yet to counter the superior Soviet conventional forces. 
The US argued to integrate Germany into NATO in order to enforce a Western 
European defense with German divisions132. The French government, which saw 
a sovereign armed Germany as an equal threat compared to that of the Soviet 
Union, emotionally rejected this plan. To discredit the establishment of German 
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national divisions the French Prime Minister Renè Pleven proposed in October 
1950 the idea to integrate German forces on the battalion level in a European 
army without a German General Staff and not under national German control.133 
The modified plan was called European Defense Community (EDC) and was 
accepted by Germany as well as by the US. On the 27th of May 1952 the EDC 
treaty was signed and expected to be ratified by France, Germany, Italy and the 
Benelux countries. Despite this support in August 1954, the French national 
assembly ultimately rejected the ratification of EDC.  
Nevertheless, Britain was able to convince France to accept German 
military contribution by proposing the Eden package134 1954, which included 
certain restrictions to German armament like the production of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD). An important aspect to the French approval was the British 
commitment to keep British forces in Germany. As a result West Germany 
became a member of the Western European Union (WEU) and consequently a 
member of NATO in 1955.  
West Germany’s commitment to integrate into western alliances 
guaranteed its restoration as a semi-sovereign state after World War II. 
European defense structures were seen as constituent of transatlantic defense. 
An example for this basic attitude was the German amendment to the Elysèe 
treaty in January 1963. The intention of the Franco-German Elysée treaty was to 
improve the defense cooperation of the two countries. However, the 
simultaneous tension in the transatlantic relations regarding NATO’s strategy to 
change Flexible Response suggests the interpretation that France especially was 
searching for alternatives to NATO to balance the US domination in European 
security affairs.135 The German parliament insisted on a preamble to the treaty, 
which presented Germany’s special commitment to NATO in spite of German 
participation in other bilateral relations.  
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2. German Reunification; Resurgence of a Great Power? 
Somewhat similar to Germany’s fate after World War II was the question 
over the future of a reunited Germany during the events in 1989-90. Germany’s 
integration in military defense structures were a key issue during the negotiations 
among the big four countries. While in 1955 West Germany’s sovereignty 
depended on its membership in NATO, in 1990 its membership in NATO as a 
unified nation created initially difficulties. The Soviet Union feared NATO’s 
enlargement, aimed at the east and refused until the summer 1990 its approval 
of a German membership in NATO. The positive relationship between the 
German chancellor Kohl and the Russian president Gorbachev played a 
significant role during the negotiations and finally made an agreement possible. 
On the 12 September 1990 the foreign ministers of Britain, France the US and 
the Soviet Union signed a treaty towards German unification. 
Nevertheless, Germany’s unification was not taken for granted. Even 
neighbors close to Germany had great reservations concerning a reunited 
Germany.136 The US diplomat Baker explained that the US preferred a united 
Germany integrated into NATO, “because it was not sure that a neutral Germany 
would remain non-militaristic”137.  
Even after a half century of peaceful relations between Germany and its 
neighbors, Germany’s integration into military alliances seems to be a guarantee 
against a potential rise of German military power. Klaus Hildebrand speaks of a 
special “German unrest” encouraged by Germany’s exposed central position in 
continental Europe.138  
The German strategic foreign policy takes those reservations against 
Germany as a leading power into consideration by emphasizing its multilateral 
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integration. When Schröder used the expression a “German Way”139 during the 
Iraq crisis, he was immediately criticized from all sides of the German political 
spectrum.  
Germany, which has already taking a dominant economic role among the 
European countries, is reluctant to decouple European security commitments 
from the Transatlantic Alliance. Decoupling European security from the US would 
place Germany in a dominant position in Europe challenged only by France. 
Such a position is not in accordance with Germany’s policy of integration since 
World War II.140  The ESDP is seen as the European contribution to security 
instead of a substitute to NATO.  
 
B. THE GERMAN SPECIAL RELATION TO FRANCE AND THE UNITED 
STATES  
 
1. Germany as a Link between France and NATO 
France and Germany’s way to overcome their traditional antagonism was 
to create close cooperation on different levels. Close cooperation seemed 
especially important in the production of coal and steel. Giving control over 
important war industry to a supranational agency was limiting the possible threat 
of German war preparation.    
Although France, as well as Germany, continuously tried to promote close 
partnership, the intensity of relations between Germany and France regarding 
the promotion of European defense varied as a reaction to the transatlantic ties. 
The US change from the strategy of massive retaliation to Flexible Response 
during the Kennedy administration was received in Europe as a weakening of the 
US pledge to deter a Soviet conventional attack with nuclear retaliation.141   
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In the shadow of this discord Germany attempted to improve its security 
cooperation with the nuclear power France. France and Germany signed the 
Elysèe treaty. This bilateral agreement focused on regular defense meetings, 
exchange of military personnel and cooperation in arms production.142 Germany 
expressed its unwavering commitment to NATO with a preamble to the treaty. 
This was seen by France as a betrayal of the European concept they had 
intended. French disappointment with the practical outcome of the treaty became 
even worse with the German support of the US-sponsored Multilateral Force 
(MLF). The concept of the MLF was that it should establish allied nuclear 
participation under Washington’s direction. The final proposal for the MLF in 
1963 consisted of a multinational manned fleet of 25 surface ships, armed with 
nuclear Polaris missiles. Although, those ships would have been under 
SACEUR’s command the decision to fire the missiles would have been made in 
consensus by the participating countries.143  Certainly, France did not appreciate 
the perspective of German nuclear capabilities through MLF.144  The succeeding 
chancellor Erhard promoted a much closer relationship with Washington and 
established German influence in NATO’s nuclear doctrine through the Nuclear 
Planning Group (NPG).     
During the 1970’s the US changing position under the Carter 
administration regarding the deployment of the neutron bomb to Germany put a 
heavy strain on the German-American relationship. Consequently this period 
created an improvement of Franco-German defense cooperation under Schmidt 
and d’Estaing in the form of joint contingency planning.145 
The historical as well as the contemporary events show a pattern of 
transatlantic drifting apart and rapprochement in the German foreign policy 
regarding its relationship to transatlantic and European defense. German policy 
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demonstrates the way in which democracies behave in the bargaining process of 
alliance defense. Although Germany is one of the strongest supporters of NATO, 
it searches for a more multilateral integration into different defense systems. 
Despite several disagreements with its American ally, German policy never 
regarded national defense autonomy as a credible alternative to collective 
defense. 
The lesson from Europe's failure to reach a joint decision on Iraq is 
that European countries should not have to make a choice between 
their continent and the Atlantic. German foreign policy has so far 
always succeeded in bridging a commitment to Franco-German 
reconciliation and cooperation, which is essential for European 
integration, and Germany's Atlantic orientation. Ever since German 
Social Democrats added an Atlantic preamble to the Elysée Treaty 
of 1963, the foundation stone of the post-war Franco-German 
partnership, a key role for Germany has been to prevent a collision 
between Europe's foreign policy ambitions and American policy and 
interests.146  
As a pattern, discord in NATO usually gave the impetus for a stronger 
German commitment in European defense systems.  
 
2. From US Occupation Forces to Allies in Defense 
Although the closest defense in the Transatlantic Alliance exists between 
the US and Britain, the German-US is linked just as closely in a different way. 
The misunderstandings between the US and Germany during the Iraq crisis were 
discussed not only on an objective level but also on an emotional level. The 
latent question was whether or not Germany owes the US support.  
Germany’s fate after World War II depended very much on strong external 
supporters. While continental European countries were still suffering from the 
results of the German provoked war, little interest was placed on a German 
recovery. Britain and especially the US recognized the democratic and economic 
potential in Germany. Without the strong support of US diplomats like Dean 
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Acheson147 or farsighted US military leaders like General Norstad148 it is doubtful 
which direction Germany and Europe as a whole would have taken.  
The US-led airlift campaign during the Soviet blockade of West Berlin149 
1948 became part of the collective German memory, which understands the US 
commitment in Europe and US military forces in Germany in a broader sense 
rather than solely strategic. Common values between both nations formed a 
partnership beyond a system of collective defense. The contemporary discord 
between the US and Germany has to be seen in context with diplomatic rhetoric 
necessary to balance national and international demands.  
 
C. GERMANY’S RESPONSIBILITY TO EUROPEAN DEFENSE 
1. Economic Power and Military Responsibility 
The German experience during World War II changed the German 
strategic culture fundamentally and “out of area” missions for German forces 
were refused until just recently. Germany used its economic power and monetary 
support of these alliances in exchange for it’s military contribution and it’s share 
of international responsibility.150 The refusal of German out-of-area operations 
was legally founded151 and contributed to the expression of Germany as an 
economic giant but a political dwarf. The international pressure on Germany to 
participate in collective security with a contribution of armed forces became even 
greater after the German reunification in 1990.  
The process to change the public opinion on this issue was gradually. 
German minesweepers in the Persian Gulf, the establishment of refugee camps 
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in Iran and Iraq for Kurds and German military medical personnel participating in 
the UN mission in Cambodia 1992 took place by support of humanitarian 
missions. In an important decision on July 12, 1994, Germany's highest court, the 
Federal Constitutional Court, ruled that German troops could take part in UN 
peacekeeping and peacemaking missions, as long as the Bundestag approves 
each operation by a simple majority. The court also stated that Germany can 
assign forces to NATO and WEU operations directed by implementing the 
resolutions of the UN Security Council.  
 
2. Germany’s Share of the Burden of Collective Security 
With the escalation in the Balkan crisis Germany became aware of its 
greater responsibility in collective security worldwide. Despite a latent refusal of 
the use of military force in situations other than defense, a consensus throughout 
the political parties, even in the Green Party, has developed that Germany can 
no longer neglect its growing responsibility as one of the leading countries in 
Europe. Although seldom recognized, Germany supports collective security with 
over 7,500 troops, including 2,000 in Afghanistan and 4,500 German troops on 
the Balkans.  
The German public perception of the role of its armed forces in 
international relations is still so weak that the decision making process for a 
possible deployment or the necessary increase in defense expenditures is 
usually discussed very controversially. Since the German policy of European 
defense states ESDP is separable but not separate from NATO, Germany 
contributes to both concepts equally. The bilateral agreement with France and 
Britain to develop mobile combat forces152 is in German view not inconsistent 
with Germany’s force contribution to NATO’s reaction forces. To play its 
expected military role as a leading power in Europe, Germany has to adjust its 
armed forces to stay credible. The contemporary strategy in Germany is to 
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Germany’s development after the Second World War is marked by a 
strong commitment to integrate Germany in European and transatlantic alliances. 
The establishment of national armed forces as an expression of sovereignty was 
abandoned and never became a part of German policy. The historical 
experiences in Germany and its geographic location between two major nuclear 
powers led to close transatlantic ties.  
Although external forces dominated German development, West Germany 
was able to establish a high level of sovereignty. Germany’s relation with NATO 
is a classic example of democracies that act regarding to their position within an 
alliance. Knowing very well that NATO is Germany’s primary choice as a system 
of collective defense, its relatively weak position vis-à-vis its American partner 
promotes complementary arrangements. The German Minister of Defense Peter 
Struck emphasized in 2004 the need for multilateral cooperation.  
Nobody can afford the luxury to rely on a single organization 
regarding the complex security challenges. We must promote their 
individual strength. For NATO this means: NATO can be used best 
the more it is free from tasks, which can be done better by others 
like UN, OSCE or NGOs. The same is true for NATO’s relation to 
the EU. The main objective is to avoid unnecessary duplication in 
structures and capabilities. We have only a single set of forces and 
can spend any Euro only once. 153  
The idea to create a European defense system including German forces is 
as old as the idea to incorporate German forces into NATO. Germany’s historical 
experiences created the belief to approach security affairs on a multilateral level 
that Germany tries to develop European security systems with the same 
engagement as transatlantic defense. Germany’s multilateral integration in 
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Europe including the ESDP is not seen as a substitute to NATO, but as an 
improvement to the European bargaining position. Today’s discord between 
Germany and the US is neither new nor the end of NATO. It is the logical 
process of bargaining over NATO’s future role. Part of this process is the usage 
of rhetoric on both sides emphasizing possible unilateralism or European 
alternatives to NATO. Nevertheless, even the US is subordinate to its internal 
democratic pressure to shift the burden of worldwide engagement to its NATO 
partners. During NATO’s history, the US, was on several occasions able to act 
unilaterally, but preferred the consensus with its European partners.      
Certainly, Germany will push for further development of the ESDP, but its 
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V. THESIS CONCLUSION 
The analysis of the events leading to the development of a European 
Defense Identity and the understanding of the historical backgrounds of France 
and Germany suggest the following conclusions. 
NATO is still the primary system of collective defense for the European 
Union. Although the EU’s components concerning security and defense have 
taken shape, the capability to guarantee security for the EU member states does 
not seem to be a pressing issue. The EU reached certain capabilities to act in 
international crisis-management autonomously from NATO, but barring military 
force these means are significantly limited. The diversity of national interests and 
the reluctance to increase defense expenditures among the EU members 
hindered the development of critical military assets for meaningful “out of area” 
operations. The biggest lessons were learned by the EU during the disappointing 
experiences during the European military involvement in the Balkan crisis in 
1994-1996. 
The European recognition of its military deficiencies and as a result the 
inability for credible crisis-management was the impetus for the EU to push the 
concept of a European defense identity. The UK’s involvement regarding the 
Saint-Mâlo process in 1998 had a strong influence over the development of 
ESDP. Its proposal in 2003, together with France, to establish special forces 
highly mobile and equipped to conduct Netcentric Warfare (NCW), is an example 
of European willingness to improve military capabilities.  
The EU’s critical deficiencies are the areas of military intelligence, 
transportation, interoperability and command and control. Although NATO is 
willing to support EU-led operations in these specific aspects, the EU obviously 
has also tried to achieve these capabilities. 
The analysis of the development of European defense suggests that the 
EU as a whole does not seek those capabilities to challenge NATO as the 
primary organization of collective security and defense. On the contrary, the EU 
emphasized repeatedly its supporting role within NATO. A specific issue in this 
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context is the EU’s duplication of NATO capabilities rather than concentrating all 
efforts on a significant contribution to NATO’s assets. The questions behind the 
controversy of duplication are whether those duplications are supposed to 
replace NATO’s supreme role and whether those expenditures consume 
resources, which would otherwise serve NATO and the transatlantic defense as 
a whole. The analysis of the development of ESDP leads to the conclusion that 
the answer for both questions is no. Despite official statements, the EU is 
obviously duplicating certain critical NATO capabilities and this duplication 
consumes EU resources.  But it is doubtful that those resources would have 
been available for NATO purposes.  
Using the EDI in the context of European integration was the most 
effective way to overcome the reluctance within the EU to modernize forces, and 
stabilize or increase defense expenditures after the end of the Cold War. The 
domestic politics demanded a peace-dividend. Duplication of key capabilities is 
necessary to keep the development of an autonomous but increased European 
contribution to European defense credible. 
To responsibly control the degree of European independence from NATO, 
it is important to recognize the decision-making mechanism within the EU. The 
EU policy is mainly directed by the big three, UK, France and Germany. The 
cooperation between France and Germany as the main continental actors 
creates a central force within the EU. The UK with its special relationship to the 
US acts more as a counterbalance to the idea of European integration. 
Nevertheless, several times it tipped the scales in European defense issues like 
in Saint-Mâlo.  
The ambivalent triangular relationship between France, Germany and the 
US is the decisive focus of attention. The study of the French and German 
historical approaches to European defense and the origin of their national 
identities give a thorough understanding of the motivations regarding their 
present policies. Learning from the past is a useful tool to evaluate EU future 
relationship to NATO. 
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The study of France’s approach to European security and defense 
illuminates a specific pattern of policy, which directly reflects France’s present 
position. French defense policy is a product of its historical experience, 
ambivalent relationships and influential personality. As one of the great powers in 
Europe, France developed a specific notion of French grandeur combined with a 
certain sense of a national mission. This French grandeur was always limited by 
the former world power, the UK. The rise of the United German Reich threatened 
its continental domination even more.  
Three major wars against Germany, in which France suffered heavy 
losses, created a deep rooted French desire for military strength and 
independence. However, the Second World War left France in a position of 
weakness and dependence. France had hardly the means to establish military 
power which would guarantee French sovereignty against a future German 
threat, much less against the concrete Soviet menace. France was completely 
dependent economically as well as militarily on external powers and especially 
on the US. In order to balance French aspirations for grandeur with the reality of 
weakness, France developed a policy of opposition.  
The last actual basis for France’s status as a great European power was 
taken away by the US in 1956 during the Suez crisis. Although dependent upon 
the US security umbrella, France perceived the US engagement in Europe as 
undermining an imaginary French sphere of influence. This overestimation of the 
French role regarding international influence was even more underscored by the 
presidency of Charles de Gaulle. De Gaulle perfected the French policy of 
opposition. At the same time he made sure never to stray too far from its allies. 
The French concept of military independence resulting in the French withdrawal 
from NATO’s IMS in 1966 was an enormous victory for French self-confidence, 
but strategically made no fundamental difference. France still enjoyed NATO’s 
security guarantees without placing French forces at NATO’s disposal.  
The US was among the strongest supporters of a rearmament of the 
Western part of Germany. The inevitability of a Cold War with the Soviet Union 
and the support of the dominant US made it impossible for France to hinder the 
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resurgence of its archenemy Germany. In contrast, it created the need to develop 
a French policy, which would tie Germany to France. The apparent result is a 
close cooperation between France and Germany, even though their respective 
national objectives are fundamentally differ.  
France’s policy-pattern of opposition and rapprochement to NATO and 
especially to US influence in European affairs suggest the conclusion that the 
French support for ESDP is based on similar objectives. France’s approach to 
European defense demonstrated strong opposition to a US domination through 
NATO. The policy of opposition served the purpose of demonstrating an 
independent European view, although credible means were missing to act 
independently. It is probable that France supports NATO as the primary 
guarantor for security as long as the EU does not have the capability to play an 
international role. Although France will continue to emphasize the independent 
development of ESDP, it will not drift apart form the Transatlantic Alliance. In the 
case that the EU manages to achieve capabilities equal to NATO, the findings of 
this study do not indicate that France would continue to support NATO. 
In contrast, this thesis suggests that Germany will react reluctantly to any 
policy, which tries to replace the transatlantic tie with an independent European 
Alliance. Since the end of World War II, Germany has had a vital interest in its 
multilateral integration. Germany’s reconstruction after the war as well as its 
reunification after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact was heavily dependent on 
German integration into western structures. Neutrality or the policy of a German 
Sonderweg was a favored option.  
The devastating experience of the war changed Germany’s political 
culture fundamentally. Being responsible for great suffering became part of the 
German collective memory. As a result, Germany developed reluctance towards 
the use of military force beyond defense of the German or Alliance territory, even 
if such an operation was unilateral. Germany had difficulties finding a political 
agreement regarding its responsibility to contribute to “out of area” missions even 
with the consensus of the UN Security Council or NATO. The reason for 
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Germany’s change of heart during the mid 1990’s was more a result of 
international pressure than an expression of national sovereignty.  
The positive experience in West Germany, in contrast to the suppression 
in East Germany was the foundation for a deep rooted relationship to the 
Transatlantic Alliance. Unlike France, Germany never challenged the supremacy 
of NATO as organization for security and defense. Germany’s support for a more 
independent European defense has to be seen as assurance of the variation in 
the US commitment to Europe. The Elysée treaty with France, for example, was 
in part a reaction to the US strategic change to Flexible Response.  
ESDP is Germany’s tool to achieve more capabilities, despite domestic 
demands to decrease defense expenditures. ESDP will give Europe and 
Germany a stronger bargaining position regarding the strategic decisions that 
influence European interests. Although Germany’s engagement in developing 
ESDP as a credible instrument seems to strive for European autonomy, 
Germany will not sacrifice NATO in favor of a European single handed effort. 
Since Germany’s commitment to NATO was always a reaction to US policy in 
Europe, it is probable that the US approach to international challenges will 
influence NATO strategy and simultaneously Germany’s relationship to NATO.         
The improvement of the EU’s military capabilities will definitely benefit 
NATO as primary organization to guarantee Europe’s peace and security. NATO 
has adapted to former challenges and will adapt to the growing European 
influence. A more balanced representation based on the actual share of the 
defense burden, disposal of relevant capabilities and the political willingness to 
put NATO’s decisions into action will satisfy the majority of the European NATO 
members. Knowing the risk of duplication, EU countries committed to NATO 
must establish effective arrangements to integrate European capabilities in the 
NATO structure as well as to guarantee EU access to certain NATO assets. A 
consensus regarding a division of labor between NATO and EU-led operations 















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
67 
LIST OF REFERENCES  
 
Asmus, Ronald. Opening NATO’s Door. New York: Columbia University Press, 
2002. 
 
Bono, Giovanna. NATO’s Peace Enforcement. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing 
Limited, 2003. 
 
Brenner, Michael. Reconcilable Differences. Washington DC: Brooking Institution 
Press, 2002. 
 
Burchill, Scott. Theories of international Relations. New York: Palgrave, 1996. 
 
Cogan, Charles. Forced to choose: France, the Atlantic Alliance, and NATO. 
Westport: Praeger, 1997. 
 
Davis, Jacquelyn. Reluctant Allies & Competitive Partners.  Herndon: Brassey’s 
Inc., 2003. 
 
Dettke, Dieter. U.S.-European Differences Are Many, but Manageable. 
Washington DC: European Institute, 2003. 
 
Dinner, Dan. America in the eyes of the Germans. Princeton: Markus Wiener 
Publishers, 1996. 
 
Duffield, John. World Power Forsaken. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1998. 
 
Harper, John. American Visions of Europe. Cambridge: University Press, 1996. 
 
Harrison, Michael. The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. 
 
Hildebrand, Klaus. German Foreign Policy, From Bismarck to Adenauer. London: 
Unwin Hyman Ltd, 1989. 
 
Howorth, Jolyon. France, Britain and the Euro-Atlantic Crisis in Survival, The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 45, No. 4, 2003. 
 
Hunter, Robert. ESDP: NATO’s Companion-or Competitor?. Santa Monica: 
RAND, 2002. 
 
Jordan, Robert. Norstad – Cold War Supreme Commander. New York: 
Macmillian Press LTD, 2000. 
68 
 
Kesselman, Mark.  European Politics in Transition. New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 2002. 
 
Keylor, William. The Twentieth-Century World. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2001. 
 
Kipp, Jacob. Key Issues Confronting France. Fort Leavenworth: Foreign Military 
Studies Office, 1995.  
 
 
Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994. 
 
Kuissel, Richard. Seducing the French. Berkley: University of California Press, 
1996. 
 
Lambert, Richard. Misunderstanding Each Other. Foreign Affairs, Vol.82 Number 
2, 2003. 
 
Lieven, Anatol. Ambivalent Neighbors. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment 
for intern Peace, 2003. 
 
Menges, Constantine. The Future of Germany and the Atlantic Alliance. 
Washington DC: The AEI Press, 1991. 
 
Menon, Anand. France, NATO and the Limits of Independence. New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 2000.  
 
Quinlan, Michael. European Defense Cooperation. Washington: Woodrow Wilson 
Center Press, 2001. 
 
Reed, John.  Germany and NATO. Washington: National Defense University, 
1987. 
 
Risse-Kappen, Thomas. Cooperation among Democracies. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1997. 
 
Rodman, Peter. Drifting Apart? Washington, DC: The Nixon Center, 1999. 
 
Sloan, Stanley. NATO,the European Union, and the Atlantic Community. Oxford: 
Rowan & Littlefield Publisher, 2003. 
 
Thies, Wallace. Friendly Rivals. New York: M.E. Shape, 2003. 
 
Thomas, Ian. The Promise of Alliance. Oxford: Rowman &Littlefield, 1997. 
 
69 
Yost, David. NATO Transformed. Washington, DC: United States Institute of 
Peace Press, 2000. 
 
Yost, David. Franco-German Defense Cooperation in Stephen F. Szabo, eds., 
The Bundeswehr and Western Security. London: McMillian, 1990. 
 
Yost, David. France, in Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotty, eds., The Defense 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
            
71 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
 
